Fulfilling one's potential

B"H

Bereshit (Genesis) Ch. 18:33 reads:
וילך ה' כאשר כלה לדבר אל אברהם ואברהם שב למקמו

Loosely translated;
And Hashem departed when he finished speaking to Avraham, and Avraham returned to his tent.

This takes place right after Hashem notifies Avraham of his intention to destroy Sodom which is followed by a passionate plea by Avraham to Hashem to reconsider. After Avraham managed to bargain Hashem down to sparing the city on the account of ten righteous individuals Avraham went back home.

One of the criticisms that's leveled against Avraham is that he didn't do enough! Contrast this with Moshe's statement after the sin of the golden calf. Hashem is ready to annihilate the Jewish nation (G-d forbid!) and offers to start all-over with Moshe himself. The Torah records in Shmot (Exodus) Ch. 32:32 Moshe's response:
ועתה אם תשא חטאתם ואם אין מחני נא מספרך אשר כתבת

Loosely translated:
And now forgive the nation! And should you not, erase me from this book that you've written (i.e, the Torah.)

We see that Moshe was willing to put his own life (and portion of the world to come) in order to save his fellow Jews. Avraham made no such gesture -- he simply returned to his tent. This is especially puzzling in light of the fact that Avraham is known of his pure Chessed (kindness.)

If we go back, we find a similar criticism leveled against Noach relative to Avraham (see Rashi on Bereshit (Genesis) 6:9): Noach built the ark for 120 years so everyone becomes aware of the impending doom. But he did not pro-actively attempt to make people repent to avert it.

So, ultimately, we have Noach, Avraham and Moshe in increasing order of willingness to doing for others to save them from destruction. Why the difference?

An explanation:
In the days of Noah, the concept of repentance evidently did not exist (save for Adam of Kain.) See the article Praying for Others' repentance for a detailed explanation. Since people were unable to repent, Noah did not take a proactive approach. He fulfilled the maximum potential with the act of publicly building an ark. Only after the deluge was the concept of repentance introduced into the main-stream.

So, in the time of Avraham, there was a possibility that there would be some individuals in Sodom that repented and become righteous. Avraham was after these individuals hoping that in their merit Sodom (as a whole) will be saved. However, in this point in time, there was no concept of mutual culpability and responsibility, as nothing bound one individual to another, save a family-tie. Hence, Avraham essentially could not take the same stance as Moshe did hundreds of years later. Avraham has no additional tools left in his toolbox, so he returned home. Effectively, Avraham also fulfilled the potential of his generation.


However, it wasn't until the time of Moshe, after Matan-Torah (and the getting of the Torah), that the Jewish people were formed into a nation. The concept of כל ישראל ערבים זה לזה (tran. all the Jews are culpable for one-another) came into being. Only after this point in time, could Moshe make such a claim: "erase me from your book -- I don't want this world and I don't want the next world if you're going to annihilate (G-d forbid) the Jewish nation." Moshe then also fulfilled the maximum potential of his generation (and beyond -- now that we have Torah.)

So, leveling criticism against Noah or Avraham because they did not meet the standard of the next level up is somewhat undue. They all maxed out their potential, within the spiritual limitations their respective generations were subjected to.

Another way to look at it:
In the time of Noah, he was able to be righteous, but his righteousness could not be extended beyond himself, to influence other and to prevent a disaster.
In the time of Avraham, he righteousness could be extended further by influencing other individual , to avert a catastrophe, but not at the price of מסירת נפש (=giving one's soul over.)
In the time of Moshe, due to mutual culpability within the Jewish nation, one could give himself over completely to save his fellow Jews.

We can take this one step further, though:
When Mashiach comes, speedily please G-d, we are told that the whole world will be a more peaceful, wholesome and pure place. In this new world the highest desire and delight will be to bask in Hashem's wisdom by engaging in Torah study. Spiritual pleasures are going to be heavily sought after. Since this will be done at the expense of one's physical pleasures, one will, essentially, give oneself and one's own physical desires over to Hashem (with true מסירת נפש). This will be so even without a pending disaster -- as a matter of course.

Compulsory or voluntary?

B"H

Dvarim (Deut.) Ch. 21:10 reads:
כי תצא למלחמה על איביך ונתנו ה' אלקיך בידך...

Loosely translated:
When you go to war against your enemies, the L-rd G-d will deliver him into your hands...

Rashi's commentary reads:
כי תצא למלחמה - במלחמת הרשות הכתוב מדבר

Loosely translated:
When you go to war - Scripture refers to a voluntary war...

So, the war appears to be one which the Jewish people were not coerced into, but rather one that's fought for other reasons.

However, a homiletic interpretation of "Your enemy" is the יצר הרע (=evil inclination) that a person possesses within. In other words, the scripture says that when you do battle with the evil inclination, Hashem will surly help by helping you defeat it.

Now, battle with one's evil inclination is not voluntary. In other words, one is obligated (and indeed compelled) to fight his/her own evil inclination at all times, as is alluded to in many verses in Torah. (For instance: Dvaim 17:7)

So then, what is this war being fought here? Is it voluntary (as Rashi explains) or is it compulsory?

A possible approach:
Possibly both approaches are true, but they relate to different individuals. The individual who cannot successfully provoke his/her evil inclination and do battle with it and defeat it is told that this is a voluntary war, i.e., "go for it, if you feel up to the challenge." After all, not everyone's up to the challenge and even those that are may end up loosing the battle. So, the battle is tagged as voluntary. Should the evil inclination be kindled and attach the Jew, on the other hand, then of-course the Jew is obligation to defend him- or herself.

An altogether different individual, on the other hand, who is very strong in his yiddishkait and will not be swayed by his/her evil inclination (because his evil inclination cannot exercise control over his/her actions) is commanded to actually provoke and go to war on the evil inclination until it's totally defeated and nullified.

It's also noteworthy that the term used here is על איביך which literally translates to "[go to war] over your enemies", and not עם איביך (...with your enemies) or נגד איביך (...against your enemies.) This would indicate that the Almighty give the Jew all the necessary strength to go to war with his evil inclination, but from the very get-go to be at an advantageous position -- "over you enemies." The evil inclination has no chance if a Jew is approaching the battle-field with the knowledge the the outcome of the battle has already been decided in advance: evil inclination TKO'ed in the first round.

Good shabbos.

Moshe did not answer

B"H

We find four occurrences at in the book of Bamidbar (Numbers) that seem to stand out (from all of scripture) in that Moshe was either unable or unwilling to answer questions put to him.

We find the first occurrence in Bamidbar (Numbers) Ch. 25:6 which reads:
והמה בכים פתח אהל מועד

Loosely translated:
(When Zimri brought the Midianite women, before Moshe and the entire congregation) they were all crying by the opening of the Tent of Meeting.

Rashi brings a midrash about the reason they were crying:
Zimri brought the Midianite women to Moshe and asked him: "Am I permitted to marry this woman or not? And should you say 'no', who permitted Tziporah to you?!?" Moshe was silent.


We find the second occurrence in Bamidbar (Numbers) Ch. 27:4-5, which read:
למה יגרע שם אבינו מתוך משפחתו כי אין לו בן תנה לנו אחזה בתוך אחי אבינו
ויקרב משה את משפטן לפני השם

Loosely translated:
(The daughters of Tzlofchad came to Moshe and made the following argument:) Why must the name of our father be removed from his family as he has no sons. Give us a portion of land amongst our Father's brothers.
And Moshe brought their claim to the Almighty.

Rashi again brings the midrash: The daughters of Tzlfchad made the following statement to Moshe: our father was killed for a private sin (=violation of Shabbat). He was not part of Korach's followers and he did not commit trison aginst you. Why must he be punished in the same manner as Korach and his gang by loosing his portion of the land of Israel?!?!

Here again, Moshe did not answer on his own. He went to Hashem to get guidance.


We find the third occurrence in Bamidbar (Numbers) Ch. 36:2-3,6, which read:
ויאמרו את אדני צוה השם לתת את הארץ בנחלה בגורל לבני ישראל ואדני צֻוָּה בהשם לתת את נחלת צלפחד אחינו לבנתיו
...ומגרל נחלתנו יגרע
זה הדבר אשר צוה השם לבנות צלפחד לאמר, לטוב בעיניהם תהיינה לנשים

Loosely translated:
The tribe of Menashe came to Moshe arguing as follows: Our master (=Moshe) was commanded by the Almighty to portion the land amongst the Jews and our master was further commanded by the Almighty to give the portion of Tzlofchad our brother to his daughters.... and our portion be reduced (when they get married to someone from a different tribe)... Moshe (consulted Hashem and said this is what Hashem commanded to the daughers of Tzlofchad: they shall marry who they desire (so long as they are from the same tribe, thereby not reducing the total portion of the tribe.)

Here again, Moshe did not answer on his own. He went to Hashem to get guidance.

Lastly, with a bit of time-travel we find the fourth occurrence in Bamidbar (Numbers) Ch. 9:7-8, which reads:
ויאמרו האנשים ההמה אליו אנחנו טמאים לנפש אדם למה נגרע לבלתי הקריב את קרבן יהוה במעדו בתוך בני ישראל
ויאמר אלהם משה עמדו ואשמעה מה יצוה השם לכם

Loosely translated:
(The people from the burial society came to Moshe) and they said: We are defiled with the impurity of death, why should we loose-out by not being able to bring the Pascal sacrifice at the right time with the rest of the Jews?
And Moshe said to them: stand here while I hear what Hashem shall command for you to do.


Evidently, here again Moshe did not answer on his own. He went to Hashem to get guidance.


Obviously the common thread here is that Moshe didn't answer directly when a question was posed to him. Why?!?!

To refine the question, let us look at the following:
In the first instance, Moshe could have answered very simply as follows: Tziporah was permitted to me because 1) we were married before the receiving the Torah and its prohibitions against marrying Midianites, 2) she accepted upon her the yolke of heaven, in other words, she converted.

In the second instance, Moshe could have also answered the daughters of Tzlofchad. The subject matter that we're dealing with here is not a very complicated issue in the laws of inheritance. And Moshe certainly knew the laws pertaining to this situation. He could have paskened (=make a rulling) himself.

In the third instance, Moshe could have replied the very same way without consulting with Hashem, for the answer was very straight-forward. He could have paskened again, on his own.

In the fourth instance (which happens to have occurred first, chronologically) Moshe could have come up with some answer himself. It may be somewhat unlikely that he would have commanded a Second Passover (which is what Hashem commanded) but nonetheless he didn't even try to answer.

Yes in all four instances, Moshe did not answer and did not pasken... Evidently, he was either unwilling or unable....

What's going on?

An explanation:
If we examine closely what transpired in the first two instances we will understand what caused Moshe's inhibition. We will then be able to extrapolate to the last two instances.

In the first instance Zimri ask Moshe a question. But before even giving Moshe the opportunity to answer he also offered criticism (or even an accusation.) Moshe surly had a very good answer (as stated above), but he abstained from presenting it. Had Moshe answered, an outside observer might have concluded that Moshe is attempting to defend his actions in order to maintain authority. In other words Moshe's answer might have been misinterpreted as trying to safeguard his personal interests, G-d forbid.

Moshe then, decided not to give a legal ruling and leave the matter to others, lest it be misinterpreted. Moshe did not want to be involved under these circumstances.

In the second instance the daughters of Tzlofchad came and asked for a legal ruling from Moshe, but along with the problem-statement they also added that their Father was not in the camp of Korach. Had they simply made a she'ela (presented their case and seeked advise) Moshe would have been very likely to give them ruling (as stated above). However, once they mentioned that their father was not on Korach's side (i.e., he was on Moshe's side) Moshe was no longer willing to give them a ruling. Had Moshe paskended a ruling, to an outside observer it may have been misinterpreted as if the daughters of Tzlofchad bribed Moshe to receive their father's portion. In other words, an outside oberserver may have misinterpreted Moshe's answer as a pay-back for their father's support, G-d forbid.

Again, Moshe decided not to give a legal ruling under these circumstances, lest it be misinterpreted. Instead he left it to Hashem to answer.

So, we see how great a leader Moshe was! In either cases, he could have answered and ruled, and yet when there's even a tiny chance that his actions may be misinterpreted he removed himself from the situation and deferred to others. Moshe's integrity is exemplary to the nth degree.

We can now also understand what happened in the last two instances:
In the instnace of the tribe of Menashe approaching Moshe regarding the ruling on the matter of the daughters of Tzlofchad: even though the ruling came from Above, and the matter at hand is only a derivative of the original matter, Moshe told the tribe of Menash: "I cannot hand this file. Because the genesis of this file was not for me to handle, I will not touch it even now." Again, Moshe demonstrating exemplary integrity.

In the last instance of the burial society approaching Moshe because they did not want to loose out on the very special Pascal sacrifice: there are varying opinions as to why their were ritually impure. According to one option they were impure at that point in time because they just handled the burial of Datan and Aviran. According to a different option they were impure because their were carrying the bones of Yosef to the Land of Israel.

If we go with the opinion that the burial society was impure due to handling Datan and Aviran's (i.e., Moshe's nephews') burial, had Moshe benefited the burial society in any way (such as ruling for them a second Passover), an out side observer may have misinterpreted this as payback for their services. In other words, in may have been misinterpreted as Moshe having vested interest in their actions.

If we go with the second option that the burial society was impure due to handling Yosef's bones, had Moshe benefited the burial society in any way, an outside observer may have misinterpreted this as payback for doing Moshe's work for him -- Moshe was handling Yosef's bones at first, and had given the task over to the burial society. Again, Moshe's ruling may have been misinterpreted as a form of payback.

All in all we get a glimpse into Moshe's personality and leadership, specifically by what he wasn't saying. His abstention from matters that may have had a tiny chance of being misconstrued is a true testament of his character and integrity as the proto-leader of the Jewish nation.

Please G-d may we merit many more leaders in Moshe's image, speedily!

Good Shabbos.

How is shmita related to Mt. Sinai?

B"H

In Pirkei Avot (Ethics of the Fathers) Ch. 5 it reads:
גלות באה לעולם על עבודה זרה, ועל גילוי עריות, ועל שפיכות דמים, ועל שמיטת הארץ.

Loosely translated:
Exile manifests in the world due to idol-worship, immoral relations, murder and not obeying shmita laws (=laws pertaining to the sabbatical year we must give the land on a 7-year cycle.)

What immediately jumps out are two questions. But first some background:
1) The prohibition of idol-worship is at the very foundation (and indeed fabric) of Jewish belief and practice.
2) Murder is a very serious crime which warrens an equivalently serious punishment. Practically every civilized society has laws pertaining to murder.
3) Immoral relations are also very serious crime in Judaism to the point that any product of such relations is forever branded a mamzer. These relations are also widely outlawed in most civilized societies.
Indeed all of the above three appear as prohibitions in the ten commandments as well as the 7 Noachide laws, outlawing them for all of humanity.

In light of this, we can see why the exile be brought-upon by transgressing these three prohibitions, as they are very serious indeed.

So, the first question here is: what does transgressing shmita have to do with exile and why does it appear at the same place and said with one breath along with idol-worship, murder and immoral relations? The question becomes even stronger when we consider that the first three are prohibited to all of humanity, whereas shmita only applies to the Jewish people. Not only that, but not even all Jews, just those living in the Land of Israel. And amongst those, even, it only applies to Jews who work the land.

The second question is: if the exile is a product, by divine decree, for transgressing the laws of shmita, then while the Jewish people are being punished in exile, they certainly cannot keep the laws of shmita (which only apply in the Land of Israel, as previously stated.) In other words, how does the punishment fit the crime, since by the very nature of the punishment (=exile) the laws of shmita cannot be kept? Indeed, during the time of the Babylonian exile, which lasted 70 years, the Jewish people have "missed" 10 potential shmitas that they could have kept, had they not been exiled for not keeping shmita. (See Rashi on Vayikra (Leviticus) Ch. 25:18)

A possible answer:
Rashi begins his commentary on the portion Behar with the following idea:
Why are the laws of shmita listed in great detail at the beginning of Behar? To teach us that just as the laws of shmita were given in detail and at great length, right there at mount Sinai, so too were all other Torah laws given in great detail on the same occasion.

On this very Rashi, a child might pose the question: Why specifically all the laws of shmita given? The Torah could have chosen any other law and listed its details at great length -- and Rashi could have had the very same commentary with a slight change of wording to account for the specific law chosen. We're forced to conclude, therefore, that there's a special connection between the laws of shmita and the revelation at mount Sinai during the giving of the Torah. In other words, somehow the laws of shmita, specifically, are representative of all other Torah laws, more so than any other law. But How?

To answer, we need to delve into some Jewish philosophy:
According to Jewish philosophy there is one level of emunah (=trust and belief in the Almighty) that a Jewish farmer may posses where he/she believes that the Almighty created nature and instilled in it everlasting laws. And because we trust the Almighty, we also trust that his laws are eternal. The farmer's emunah then is that if he/she plows, plants, waters and takes care of the field, and all the other conditions are just right (e.g., the temperature, humidity and wind are just right) then according to the laws of nature, which the Almighty himself created, there will be a good yield of crop.

Above that there's a higher level of emunah: the Jewish farmer believes that the Almighty is actively involved in the laws of nature. In other words, this emunah is at that the Almighty is pro-active in the development of the crop, not merely by orchestrating nature as a whole, via some laws, but rather in detail.

Both these levels of emunah are confined to nature, since they are solely within the framework of nature: either at the macro level (the first level of emunah) or at a micro level (the second level of emunah).

However, there's a higher level of emunah yet, as we can see in Vayikra Ch. 25:3-4 which read:
שש שנים תזרע שדך ושש שנים תזמר כרמך ואספת את תבואתה
ובשנה השביעת שבת שבתון יהיה לארץ שבת להשם שדך לא תזרע וכרמך לא תזמר

Loosely translated:
For six years you shall seed your wine and you shall harvest it, and the seventh year shall be a sabbatical to the land (i.e., shmita), a sabbatical to G-d, your field you shall not seed and your vine you shall not prune.

At this is the level of emunah that the farmer believes that really everything is in the hands of the Almighty. On the seventh year the Jewish farmer is not required to plow, plant, water or otherwise take care of the field. As a matter of fact, he/she is prohibited to do so. Yet the land will continue to produce. This teaches us that really, it's the Almighty in control -- not us, for if it was up to us, inaction of the seventh year would mean no food. See the article about Superrational Trust for further clarification on this point.

Whereas the first two levels of emunah are limited by the framework of nature, the third level is not. At the third and higher level of emunah the Jew (farmer or otherwise) believes that although the Almighty acts within nature (making the crop give good yield, for instance) however the flux of abundance comes from a level higher than nature. In other words, Hashem acts within nature but from beyond nature.

What better mitzvah (=commandment), from the set of 613, is there to demonstrate that the flux of abundance originates beyond nature? What better mitzvah is there to demonstrate that the Almighty's ways are incomparable to nature?

Even the mitzvah of the Red Heifer, which is the most irrational mitzvah (as testified by Shlomo HaMelech, King Salomon, the wisest of all people) lacks in this respect. Whereas the Red Heifer defies logic to demonstrate the Hashem is beyond logic and understanding, more so than any other mitzvah, by purifying the tainted while tainting the pure in the process, there is no visible difference to the human eye. An impure person looks no different than a perfectly pure one. We know that there's a difference, but we cannot perceive it. This is precisely where the laws of shmita excel: there is nothing more tangible to a person than food on the table. There's nothing that announces that "The Almighty manipulates nature from beyond the laws of nature" than when the Jewish farmer abstains from working the land on shmita years, and yet there's food in the field, on the table and in the tummy. The farmer made no effort on his-/herown behalf, and yet all his essential needs were taken care of by Hashem.

This is then the connection between Behar and shmita: Rashi's comment can now be understood to also mean that just as the laws of shmita were given in their entirety (that is, in a way that would announce loud and clear that Hashem works within nature but from beyond nature, i.e, just as the laws of shmita affect this lowly world, but are rooted in higher realms) so too all the other mitzvahs. This includes those that we can logically explain -- although there's a logical explanation, you should know that at their essence these mitzvahs are rooted in higher reals, they're all supernal and super-rational. To come to this realization, we specifically need the most tangible instance of such a mitzvah -- shmita laws.

We can now undertand better Pirkei Avot: The first question was asked why shmita was mentioned in the same breath as the prohibition of idol worship, murder and improper relation, in lieu of these three being fundamental laws. The explanation is, then, that shmita is most fundamental from a philosophical point of view as it reflect the supernal source of all Torah laws.

The second question was what's the connection between shmita and the exile, especially in lieu of the fact that shmita laws can certainly not be kept while in exile. The explanation to that is already given at length in the Superrational Trust article. See the part about Hashem defying logic due to the promise/blessing that on the sixth year the land gives the greatest yield.

Good shabbos with lots of emunah and yield both physically and spiritually.

Perfect Awe

B"H

Mishlei (Proverbs), Ch. 2:4-5 reads:
אִם תְּבַקְשֶׁנָּה כַכָּסֶף וְכַמַּטְמוֹנִים תַּחְפְּשֶׂנָּה אָז תָּבִין יִרְאַת השם


In pshat simple reading, this quote can be translated loosely as follows:
If you seek her (=understanding) like silver and search for her like treasures, then you shall come to understand the awe (also = fear) of G-d.

I was reading this today and rendered it like so:
If you seek כַכָּסֶף with love, (etymologically related to כסופים, נכסוף נכספתי - meaning love),
ְמַּטְמוֹנִים to correct and refine your midot (comes from 'מט forty-nine, מונים we count - referring to the 49 days we count the Omer, to refine our midot -- 49 character traits and attributes).
Then you shall reach יִרְאַת השם (awe of G-d) at the level of תָּבִין, that is to say you shall reach an higher level of awe (יראה עילאה).

Explanation:
This type of fear (יראה) is not the "lower level" fear (יראה תתאה) that a person feel when he/she is at the position to transgress. But simply because of the punishment he/she is destined to received (and other possible repercussions to him- or herself) he/she shows restraint and avoids the transgression.

For if there was no punishment there would be no impetus to avoid transgression -- there would be no repercussions. Because this level of fear is predicated on punishment avoidance, it is considered a lower level of fear.

Rather, because of מט' מונים with כסופים, a person reaches a higher level of awe (יראה עילאה). This is the type of awe that a person feels when he/she contemplates the awesomeness, greatness and infinity of G-d Almighty, the fact that G-d is incomparably greater than the entire universe (שלא בערך לעולם) and the fact that the Almighty fill the whole universe (מלא כל הארץ כבודו, כבודו מלא עולם). And ultimately there's really nothing other than G-d (אין עוד מלבדו) i.e., all of creation is really a manifestation of G-d through countless concealments and there's no independent existence from G-d.

When all this contemplation is done using a person's בינה (viz. תָּבִין) i.e., intellectual faculty of understanding, it causes him/her to avoid transgressions, not out of pure fear of punishment (as in יראה תתאה), but rather from a deep feeling of shame before the creator -- to transgress against an all-seeing, all-knowing, omni-present, omni-conscient G-d would be simply unfathomable! Impossible! Indeed, this is the level of יראה עילאה.

Good Shabbos.